

THE HISTORY OF THE SEARCH FOR A MODERN PERSON IN UKRAINE FROM THE  
PERSPECTIVE OF THE DANIEL LERNER'S THEORY: DID UKRAINE HAVE ANY  
CHANCE TO BUILD A MODERN PERSON?

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Taking into account the Daniel Lerner's theory of modernization and economic development, designed to solve the problems of transition from the 'backwardness' to 'modernity' (very common in the West and reflected in the US desire to intelligently subdue 'the third world' countries), we will try to answer the question whether such person as I (Russian by nationality, having the Ukrainian passport and living in Vienna) can try to solve the following issues. Is there a modern person in Ukraine? Is there a chance for Ukraine to create or develop the modern person? Will this Ukrainian modern person correspond to the European concept of "modernity"? And can there also be another concept of "modernity" which differs from the European one? We will try to answer all these questions within the Lerner's theory of modernization.

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If we consider 'modernity' through the prism of the European concept of modernity, or as accessory to the European, then the Ukrainian society can't be modern in any way because of the simple reason, that we have no such level of social, economic, and political development as the Europe has. As a proof any economic reports could be taken into account, but the most banal – the yearly level of economic development across the countries [The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015]. According to these ratings Ukraine is on the 76th place and has never occupied the first places.

But this would be true if we looked from the point of view of that concept of 'modernity', which is imposed to the world community by the developed Europe. Why would all other countries actually reckon with these European concepts of 'modernity' and 'development'? Europe has imposed the complex of guilt and inferiority on the rest of the world. All are now striving to achieve this cherished modernity and the development level.

Generally, the very history of the 'modernity' concept shows the attempts to reveal it by various authors (once again mostly by the western authors), including Lerner [Lerner (1958): 44]; in my opinion this history itself predetermined the following Eurocentric trend of such a concept. I mean that actually all authors who started looking for answers to questions of existence of difference in development between the countries began to look for this distinction between notions of 'their'

West and 'not their' East! But the world isn't bipolar! Why almost none of such studies ever even mention Russia (I am not speaking about Ukraine; Ukraine did not exist at that time, but the Russian Empire existed since the 18th century, and was taking the second place on Earth with the occupied land territory, namely 1/6 of the total land area; how could such a great land territory be overlooked?)? Besides, the Russian Empire (on the part of which the state of Ukraine was formed in 1991) had culture, which absolutely differed from any eastern one with its state, language, traditions, beliefs, ceremonies - everything that played a role in formation of the modern man was absolutely different - not eastern and not western. Just another – the Russian one.

So let's talk about the 'modern'. Almost in any sources, where such a concept of modernity is mentioned, the industrialization level is meant. As Peer Vries reasons, it is all about the initial boom of development of 1810th and of country's trade distribution, when the world 'division of labour and division of wealth' occurred [Vries (2013): 273], which resulted in formation of industrialized and not industrialized countries, as well as the asymmetric development. However it shouldn't be forgotten that Industrialization in the Russian Empire was the response to the similar processes happening in the Western Europe, where the industrial revolution began in the XVIII century. But even earlier, in the XVII century, the accelerated development of the industry began in Holland. In this regard, already under the reign of Peter I the need for

the rapid industrialization of the country was recognized. According to R. Dupuy and T. Dupuy 'in the era of Ivan Grozny Russia had quite a developed industry and crafts. Especially a lot of progress has been achieved in the weapons and artillery affairs. In terms of production of guns and other weapons, their quality, diversity and properties Russia of that time was perhaps a European leader. By the size of the artillery park (2 thousand guns) Russia was superior to other European countries, and all the guns were of domestic production' (and Ukraine was the part of Russia) [Dupuy (2004): 142-143]. As it is pointed out by the historian N. Rozhkov, in Russia of that time many other types of industrial and handicraft production were developing, including metal, furniture, tableware, linseed oil and so on. Some of these kinds of industrial products were exported [Rozhkov (1928): 24-29]. The first paper-manufacturing factory in the country was built under the reign of Ivan Grozny [Pokrovsky (1911): 117]. You can ask why am I talking about Russia, if the topic is about Ukraine? The answer is very simple: Ukraine did not exist at that time, it was only the region of the Russian Empire and just in 1991 Ukraine gained its independence. You might say, so that is the answer – there is no industrialization, no development, and therefore the first and essential element in achieving the status of 'modernity' is missing. I dare to protest – there was no Ukrainian state, but there was industrialization on its territory, as there was industrialization on the entire territory of present-day Russia. In the 20s-30s of the 20th

century in the Ukrainian territory the forced process of construction of the industrial enterprises of heavy and light industry was initiated. As Stalin said in his report of 1931: 'We are lagging behind the advanced countries for 50-100 years. We must cover this distance in ten years. Either we do it or they crush us' [Stalin (1951): 29.]. Thus, since the late 1920s and until 1941 hundreds of new industrial enterprises were built in Ukraine. The main enterprises covered the entire territory of the USSR with their operations [Liber (1992): 322].

Cold War also played a huge role in the accelerated industrialization of the Soviet Union countries. Another thing is whether those funds from industrialization have been used rationally or not. In fact, the bulk of the revenue went for military purposes and settled in the pockets of the higher power echelons, while the vast majority of ordinary people did not catch a penny from this amount. As it is noted by J. Boffa: 'The growth of shadow economy' is referred to the Khrushchev's years, although the latter tried to fight it with severe methods, including even the death penalty in cases of embezzlement or the largest theft of state property. But the real qualitative leap was made in the reign of Brezhnev and Kosygin. The reason for that was not only an inevitable weakening of state control, but an increase in the flow of goods, which was still insufficient to meet the needs of the increased population rate. Between these two events there was a direct link' [Boffa (1996): 68].

What else besides industrialization can help us to create a modern man, to reach the level of modern development and to make this process irreversible and progressive? Empathy – answers Lerner, arguing that modernization is a kind of mental shift, an achievement of a particular state of mind, which contributes to the achievement of the state of 'development', being an integral part of it. The presence of empathy implies the need for identification of social workers with the new political leaders and programs, new economic products and modern social institutions [Lerner (2000)]. In other words, according to this approach, the success of modernization and general reformation

process depends on the degree of people's sense of involvement in the processes happening in the society, the degree of identification with the occurring transformations, the belief that these transformations are designed to improve their lives or reduce 'the fundamental concern'.

Lerner in 'The passing of traditional society' demonstrates how deep contradictions between the traditional and the modern have smoothed through the development of new traits such as empathy and horizons expansion. The sociologist argues, that in order to discuss the new values and styles of behaviour, learned in the process of modernization, individuals should be more flexible and be able to establish relationships with a variety of people. Individuals are learning that empathy through participation in contemporary social forms such as factories, cities, schools, politics and the media' [Lerner (2000): 119]. The latter form the 'agenda' that is common for all or most social groups, thereby creating a consolidated social whole, united not only with project of the future, but also with the appropriate feelings about it, that is – shared with social well-being, which, of course, must be positive and constructive.

Thus, Lerner emphasizes the essential characteristic of social reform is the degree of social solidarity. It affects the type of social being that determines, in turn, the prospects of any macro-transformations. In one word, the success of modernization of society must be presented through solidarity. The desired degree of consolidation creates the necessary social well being – a social empathy. It is a vector, which is distributed on both macro and micro-social level, and without which the prospects of modernization and reformation become very problematic.

Of course we cannot say that Ukrainian society has no empathy at all. People are sharing such characteristics as: mutual influence of citizens on public policy, mutual responsibility and respect (between employers and employees), the equality between different nations, equal rights and duties of men and women, continuity and mutual respect between the older and younger generations, mutual responsibility and respect

between the people and the authorities. I.e. the content of consciousness of the overwhelming majority of citizens includes the rules that can be defined as the constructive, based on the values of collectivism and democracy. But I would say that people share norms only on paper, in theory, but in practice there are: immutable bureaucracy, corruption, beating all records for its size, the lack of social benefits, wages below the subsistence level, poor goods and services quality and the lack of consumer protection. How can people even dream of some kind of empathy under such circumstances?

Having not found thus general use of the empathy term, I stumbled upon a term 'empathic joining' widely used in the scholarly circulation. It was introduced by the American social psychologist E. Staub, who was describing it as a special type of intra-group interaction, a peculiar form of empathy arising in the group, in which the 'emotional contamination acts as means for mutual influence and a source of satisfaction for the members of the group' [Staub (1992): 238]. In modern psychology, 'empathic joining' can mean a form of cognition of a person by a person, one way of emotional reaction of the subject (the reaction of compassion), determinant of human behaviour in social interaction, as well as a method of psychotherapy (see: [Hoffman (1987); Barlow (2008)]). As examples of 'empathic connection' in the sociological sense we can offer the support, for example, by the Soviet people of a number of programs and projects of the country's leadership, including: space exploration, the development of virgin lands, VI World Festival of Youth and Students (Moscow, 1957), Olympic Games 1980 etc. Empathic joining is emotional support of various kinds of community initiatives – from the protection of tropical forests to the movement of non-resistance, from the salvation of blue whales to assistance to children in Africa. Phenomena of the same order are nationalist enthusiasm and jingoism (it is enough to recall the jubilation in the US over the murder of Ben Laden in early May 2011, presented to the world an example of a high level of empathic connection of Americans to their President and the US military).

This is also the pride of 'our' army, 'our science', 'and cult of personality'. The main difference between the empathic joining and the 'simple' enthusiasm, which is covering sometimes large and small social communities, is that enthusiasm is usually short-lived and is optional in the identification sense, while empathic joining, as a rule, is characterized by long-term nature and involves even identification of the person to its subject. But, unfortunately, in modern Ukrainian society the situation with emphatic joining is more than negative. We can note the actual lack of identification of Ukrainian citizens with key political figures of the domestic political Olympus and political underground.

Thus, the macro-level of consolidation of Ukrainian society, to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired. The degree of social complementarity – identification with leading political figures, community development programs, new socio-economic and political institutions – is extremely low. Practically there is no empathic connection to the power entities – agents of social reform ('modernization'), and institutions, providing both the reform and daily operation of the society. The lack of empathy on the macro-level is no less dangerous than at micro social interactions. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the system of basic public relations of the Ukrainian society is, in fact, not sanctioned by the dominant norms, forcing all people to live and think in the notorious 'double standards'.

It is obvious that without the proper level of empathy, social complementarity and the proper level of consistency between the norm in the beliefs and practices of social factuality the necessary social well-being, which is intended to ensure the success of socio-economic development and the actual project to modernize the Ukrainian state, cannot be build.

Mass media. Lerner continues to ascend to the modernity. We need mass media says he. According to Lerner 'irreversible' modernization process is inherently linked with the role of the media, which should give to developing countries an example of

what actually should be pursued (based on the example of the West). And if Daniel Lerner, giving a leading role in the modernization to the media, is not interested in any type of media suitable for this role, then Wilbur Schramm [Schramm (1964)] and Ite de Sola Pool fill this gap. The second author emphasizes the contribution of commercial media, in particular the American media, to the modernization process. Are they not more efficient (compared to social media) in a heightened sense of 'desire of another way of life' due to hosted persistent advertising [Pool (1963): 285]? This thesis, as a good cover for private and public American strategy, for example, is one of the common characteristics of elements of the development/modernization theory. And what about Ukraine? Now we will talk about some specific points associated with implementation of the general premises concerning the European integration of Ukraine.

It is clear that any integration projects are doomed without the support of the media. After all, the media are one of the most important factors in the formation of public opinion in the world today. And without Ukrainian public opinion concerning the implementation of the European vector, the political elite have no chances to operate this project. However, the question arises – whether the Ukrainian media truthfully illuminate the situation in Europe, whether they are objectively analysing the need for to Ukraine to join the European community? Or more: whether the position of Europe on certain issues of political, economic and cultural life is revealed in the Ukrainian information space?

When we start answering these questions quite a negative picture is emerging. Illumination of events in European countries by Ukrainian media in most cases could not be called objective. And this is so due to various reasons. A specified majority of newspapers, magazines and television stations are in one or another degree affiliated with some political Parties, therefore, the information is presented through a very narrow angle of view. The others – the so-called yellow press and private radio stations – seek to attract the audience's

attention to sensational scandals, crime news, and the private life of famous people. Finally, the government media is focused mainly on officialdom. As to the problem of the need for Ukraine to enter Europe, it is mostly only declared, but not supported by any arguments.

It should be noted that even in the media, which really set the direction for the European development of Ukraine and are trying to give the audience a true picture of life in Western Europe, there is almost no analysis of experience of countries which have already passed the stage of European integration. We are talking about the majority of the former communist bloc. Meanwhile, the experience of these countries is extremely interesting and instructive for Ukraine, because some problems as well as their solutions on the way of entering the Europe are common for all.

And what about Ukraine? In Ukraine, in addition to hot-Civil war, the Cold War is taking place. Thus, the television offices broadcasting Russian TV are destroyed, criminal cases against Russian actors are opened, TV series with the 'wrong' actors who supported the Donbas are banned. There is no alternative.

Finally, institutions. As written by Vries: '(Western) Europe, in their view, was institutionally different and that is fundamental in any explanation of the Great Divergence' [Vries (2013): 320]. Michael Mitterauer, Vries continues, also thinks the roots of European exceptionalism are deep and to a large extent institutional [Vries (2013): 320]. So why, then, there is no development in Ukraine? Where is the Ukrainian modern man and can he/she be created in Ukraine?

Now at the highest administrative level proud promises are made to pull Ukraine closer to Europe. It seems that this country has always been in the background of Europe, almost a beggar, and now has a chance to become related to Europe, and, therefore, to move towards success.

Ukrainian ruling elite, of course, are interested in the image of previous backward and exhausted Ukraine, as such a past is rehabilitating the present. That present, to which the ruling elite and the political and corporate business

had lowered the country. For this reason it became forgotten that in Soviet times Ukraine was famous not only for its technological advancement and advanced science, culture and education, but it was a developed country of the Soviet Union.

The present Ukraine is considered in Europe as one of the most backward countries. It seems that the reasons for the fall of Ukraine can be found in the sphere of economic. But then the question arises: where did this bad economy come from? To answer this question, we must turn consider not only economic but also moral and spiritual state. In this respect, even Lev Gumilyov gave the formula: 'The Spirit is over matter'. In this context the following statement of Vsevolod Chaplin – the head of department on cooperation of church and society (Russia) attracts our attention. He declared: '...If the government does not want to be gnawed out slowly, and people – to feed ... someone else's business, you need to go to the dictatorship of conscience and will. Will political and moral' [Bychkov (2012)].

Let us recall that the phenomenon of the economic miracle, whether it was the time of Britain Protestantism, or the period of China Deng Xiaoping's reforms, or the Soviet industrialization and changes in the 1928-1935, always were based on the explosive enthusiasm and belief in the future. But converse is also true: spiritual oppression, lacks of faith and moral strain are not compatible with economic success. And the fact that Ukraine is now economically weak is not based only on miscalculations in the government's economic development. It is not only because of the variety of the proposed models or wrong ways to implement them. The most devastating influence is brought by non-believers in fate and the oppressed spirit. The most striking thing in this context is that the majority of Ukrainians do not consider themselves to be the creators of their own destiny. The same pessimism appears in the hopes for improvement of future live.

Conclusions. So are there nevertheless modern men in Ukraine? Have they ever been there? Or maybe there is a chance to grow them in the present conditions? Being nevertheless a Russian by nationality, having

Ukrainian passport and living in Vienna, I would say that Europe probably will never see people from countries such as Ukraine in the 'developed' or 'modern' lists. People from pro-Soviet space in Europe are being treated with biases and perceived as a yoke on the neck of socialism. It is harder for us to nostrify our diplomas, sometimes even impossible, it is more difficult to find a job. The existing stereotypes about us are not always good (as well as about all the 'foreigners' actually). In spite of this, people in Ukraine, as in all countries, are different, but they are educated, kind, sympathetic, friendly, and certainly not less developed than the Europeans. They have another kind of development itself, not the European one, but it is clear that they have another historical heritage, can never go back to the beginning of the 19th century and get ahead of England in terms of economic and industrial development. But why actually that very Britain and its environment expressed by the modern Europe were considered possible to accept and use the only single 'quality standard' of development, a single version of modernity? Who granted them this right? And why all others considered by Europe to be 'not developed countries' have to feel all the time like 'catching up'? May it be enough to measure everything within the same Eurocentrism standards?

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